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📁 ..	-	2026-03-21 15:45
📄 __init__.py	0 B	2021-05-26 16:59
📁 __pycache__	-	2026-03-21 15:45
📄 _appengine_environ.py """ This module provides means to detect the App Engine environment. """ import os def is_appengine(): return is_local_appengine() or is_prod_appengine() def is_appengine_sandbox(): """Reports if the app is running in the first generation sandbox. The second generation runtimes are technically still in a sandbox, but it is much less restrictive, so generally you shouldn't need to check for it. see https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/runtimes """ return is_appengine() and os.environ["APPENGINE_RUNTIME"] == "python27" def is_local_appengine(): return "APPENGINE_RUNTIME" in os.environ and os.environ.get( "SERVER_SOFTWARE", "" ).startswith("Development/") def is_prod_appengine(): return "APPENGINE_RUNTIME" in os.environ and os.environ.get( "SERVER_SOFTWARE", "" ).startswith("Google App Engine/") def is_prod_appengine_mvms(): """Deprecated.""" return False	957 B	2021-05-26 16:59
📁 _securetransport	-	2026-03-21 15:45
📄 appengine.py """ This module provides a pool manager that uses Google App Engine's `URLFetch Service <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/urlfetch>`_. Example usage:: from urllib3 import PoolManager from urllib3.contrib.appengine import AppEngineManager, is_appengine_sandbox if is_appengine_sandbox(): # AppEngineManager uses AppEngine's URLFetch API behind the scenes http = AppEngineManager() else: # PoolManager uses a socket-level API behind the scenes http = PoolManager() r = http.request('GET', 'https://google.com/') There are `limitations <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/\ urlfetch/#Python_Quotas_and_limits>`_ to the URLFetch service and it may not be the best choice for your application. There are three options for using urllib3 on Google App Engine: 1. You can use :class:`AppEngineManager` with URLFetch. URLFetch is cost-effective in many circumstances as long as your usage is within the limitations. 2. You can use a normal :class:`~urllib3.PoolManager` by enabling sockets. Sockets also have `limitations and restrictions <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/sockets/\ #limitations-and-restrictions>`_ and have a lower free quota than URLFetch. To use sockets, be sure to specify the following in your ``app.yaml``:: env_variables: GAE_USE_SOCKETS_HTTPLIB : 'true' 3. If you are using `App Engine Flexible <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/flexible/>`_, you can use the standard :class:`PoolManager` without any configuration or special environment variables. """ from __future__ import absolute_import import io import logging import warnings from ..exceptions import ( HTTPError, HTTPWarning, MaxRetryError, ProtocolError, SSLError, TimeoutError, ) from ..packages.six.moves.urllib.parse import urljoin from ..request import RequestMethods from ..response import HTTPResponse from ..util.retry import Retry from ..util.timeout import Timeout from . import _appengine_environ try: from google.appengine.api import urlfetch except ImportError: urlfetch = None log = logging.getLogger(__name__) class AppEnginePlatformWarning(HTTPWarning): pass class AppEnginePlatformError(HTTPError): pass class AppEngineManager(RequestMethods): """ Connection manager for Google App Engine sandbox applications. This manager uses the URLFetch service directly instead of using the emulated httplib, and is subject to URLFetch limitations as described in the App Engine documentation `here <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/urlfetch>`_. Notably it will raise an :class:`AppEnginePlatformError` if: * URLFetch is not available. * If you attempt to use this on App Engine Flexible, as full socket support is available. * If a request size is more than 10 megabytes. * If a response size is more than 32 megabytes. * If you use an unsupported request method such as OPTIONS. Beyond those cases, it will raise normal urllib3 errors. """ def __init__( self, headers=None, retries=None, validate_certificate=True, urlfetch_retries=True, ): if not urlfetch: raise AppEnginePlatformError( "URLFetch is not available in this environment." ) warnings.warn( "urllib3 is using URLFetch on Google App Engine sandbox instead " "of sockets. To use sockets directly instead of URLFetch see " "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reference/urllib3.contrib.html.", AppEnginePlatformWarning, ) RequestMethods.__init__(self, headers) self.validate_certificate = validate_certificate self.urlfetch_retries = urlfetch_retries self.retries = retries or Retry.DEFAULT def __enter__(self): return self def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb): # Return False to re-raise any potential exceptions return False def urlopen( self, method, url, body=None, headers=None, retries=None, redirect=True, timeout=Timeout.DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, response_kw ): retries = self._get_retries(retries, redirect) try: follow_redirects = redirect and retries.redirect != 0 and retries.total response = urlfetch.fetch( url, payload=body, method=method, headers=headers or {}, allow_truncated=False, follow_redirects=self.urlfetch_retries and follow_redirects, deadline=self._get_absolute_timeout(timeout), validate_certificate=self.validate_certificate, ) except urlfetch.DeadlineExceededError as e: raise TimeoutError(self, e) except urlfetch.InvalidURLError as e: if "too large" in str(e): raise AppEnginePlatformError( "URLFetch request too large, URLFetch only " "supports requests up to 10mb in size.", e, ) raise ProtocolError(e) except urlfetch.DownloadError as e: if "Too many redirects" in str(e): raise MaxRetryError(self, url, reason=e) raise ProtocolError(e) except urlfetch.ResponseTooLargeError as e: raise AppEnginePlatformError( "URLFetch response too large, URLFetch only supports" "responses up to 32mb in size.", e, ) except urlfetch.SSLCertificateError as e: raise SSLError(e) except urlfetch.InvalidMethodError as e: raise AppEnginePlatformError( "URLFetch does not support method: %s" % method, e ) http_response = self._urlfetch_response_to_http_response( response, retries=retries, response_kw ) # Handle redirect? redirect_location = redirect and http_response.get_redirect_location() if redirect_location: # Check for redirect response if self.urlfetch_retries and retries.raise_on_redirect: raise MaxRetryError(self, url, "too many redirects") else: if http_response.status == 303: method = "GET" try: retries = retries.increment( method, url, response=http_response, _pool=self ) except MaxRetryError: if retries.raise_on_redirect: raise MaxRetryError(self, url, "too many redirects") return http_response retries.sleep_for_retry(http_response) log.debug("Redirecting %s -> %s", url, redirect_location) redirect_url = urljoin(url, redirect_location) return self.urlopen( method, redirect_url, body, headers, retries=retries, redirect=redirect, timeout=timeout, response_kw ) # Check if we should retry the HTTP response. has_retry_after = bool(http_response.getheader("Retry-After")) if retries.is_retry(method, http_response.status, has_retry_after): retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=http_response, _pool=self) log.debug("Retry: %s", url) retries.sleep(http_response) return self.urlopen( method, url, body=body, headers=headers, retries=retries, redirect=redirect, timeout=timeout, response_kw ) return http_response def _urlfetch_response_to_http_response(self, urlfetch_resp, response_kw): if is_prod_appengine(): # Production GAE handles deflate encoding automatically, but does # not remove the encoding header. content_encoding = urlfetch_resp.headers.get("content-encoding") if content_encoding == "deflate": del urlfetch_resp.headers["content-encoding"] transfer_encoding = urlfetch_resp.headers.get("transfer-encoding") # We have a full response's content, # so let's make sure we don't report ourselves as chunked data. if transfer_encoding == "chunked": encodings = transfer_encoding.split(",") encodings.remove("chunked") urlfetch_resp.headers["transfer-encoding"] = ",".join(encodings) original_response = HTTPResponse( # In order for decoding to work, we must present the content as # a file-like object. body=io.BytesIO(urlfetch_resp.content), msg=urlfetch_resp.header_msg, headers=urlfetch_resp.headers, status=urlfetch_resp.status_code, response_kw ) return HTTPResponse( body=io.BytesIO(urlfetch_resp.content), headers=urlfetch_resp.headers, status=urlfetch_resp.status_code, original_response=original_response, **response_kw ) def _get_absolute_timeout(self, timeout): if timeout is Timeout.DEFAULT_TIMEOUT: return None # Defer to URLFetch's default. if isinstance(timeout, Timeout): if timeout._read is not None or timeout._connect is not None: warnings.warn( "URLFetch does not support granular timeout settings, " "reverting to total or default URLFetch timeout.", AppEnginePlatformWarning, ) return timeout.total return timeout def _get_retries(self, retries, redirect): if not isinstance(retries, Retry): retries = Retry.from_int(retries, redirect=redirect, default=self.retries) if retries.connect or retries.read or retries.redirect: warnings.warn( "URLFetch only supports total retries and does not " "recognize connect, read, or redirect retry parameters.", AppEnginePlatformWarning, ) return retries # Alias methods from _appengine_environ to maintain public API interface. is_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_appengine is_appengine_sandbox = _appengine_environ.is_appengine_sandbox is_local_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_local_appengine is_prod_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_prod_appengine is_prod_appengine_mvms = _appengine_environ.is_prod_appengine_mvms	10.75 KB	2021-05-26 16:59
📄 ntlmpool.py """ NTLM authenticating pool, contributed by erikcederstran Issue #10, see: http://code.google.com/p/urllib3/issues/detail?id=10 """ from __future__ import absolute_import from logging import getLogger from ntlm import ntlm from .. import HTTPSConnectionPool from ..packages.six.moves.http_client import HTTPSConnection log = getLogger(__name__) class NTLMConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool): """ Implements an NTLM authentication version of an urllib3 connection pool """ scheme = "https" def __init__(self, user, pw, authurl, args, kwargs): """ authurl is a random URL on the server that is protected by NTLM. user is the Windows user, probably in the DOMAIN\\username format. pw is the password for the user. """ super(NTLMConnectionPool, self).__init__(args, **kwargs) self.authurl = authurl self.rawuser = user user_parts = user.split("\\", 1) self.domain = user_parts[0].upper() self.user = user_parts[1] self.pw = pw def _new_conn(self): # Performs the NTLM handshake that secures the connection. The socket # must be kept open while requests are performed. self.num_connections += 1 log.debug( "Starting NTLM HTTPS connection no. %d: https://%s%s", self.num_connections, self.host, self.authurl, ) headers = {"Connection": "Keep-Alive"} req_header = "Authorization" resp_header = "www-authenticate" conn = HTTPSConnection(host=self.host, port=self.port) # Send negotiation message headers[req_header] = "NTLM %s" % ntlm.create_NTLM_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE( self.rawuser ) log.debug("Request headers: %s", headers) conn.request("GET", self.authurl, None, headers) res = conn.getresponse() reshdr = dict(res.getheaders()) log.debug("Response status: %s %s", res.status, res.reason) log.debug("Response headers: %s", reshdr) log.debug("Response data: %s [...]", res.read(100)) # Remove the reference to the socket, so that it can not be closed by # the response object (we want to keep the socket open) res.fp = None # Server should respond with a challenge message auth_header_values = reshdr[resp_header].split(", ") auth_header_value = None for s in auth_header_values: if s[:5] == "NTLM ": auth_header_value = s[5:] if auth_header_value is None: raise Exception( "Unexpected %s response header: %s" % (resp_header, reshdr[resp_header]) ) # Send authentication message ServerChallenge, NegotiateFlags = ntlm.parse_NTLM_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE( auth_header_value ) auth_msg = ntlm.create_NTLM_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE( ServerChallenge, self.user, self.domain, self.pw, NegotiateFlags ) headers[req_header] = "NTLM %s" % auth_msg log.debug("Request headers: %s", headers) conn.request("GET", self.authurl, None, headers) res = conn.getresponse() log.debug("Response status: %s %s", res.status, res.reason) log.debug("Response headers: %s", dict(res.getheaders())) log.debug("Response data: %s [...]", res.read()[:100]) if res.status != 200: if res.status == 401: raise Exception("Server rejected request: wrong username or password") raise Exception("Wrong server response: %s %s" % (res.status, res.reason)) res.fp = None log.debug("Connection established") return conn def urlopen( self, method, url, body=None, headers=None, retries=3, redirect=True, assert_same_host=True, ): if headers is None: headers = {} headers["Connection"] = "Keep-Alive" return super(NTLMConnectionPool, self).urlopen( method, url, body, headers, retries, redirect, assert_same_host )	4.06 KB	2021-05-26 16:59
📄 pyopenssl.py """ TLS with SNI_-support for Python 2. Follow these instructions if you would like to verify TLS certificates in Python 2. Note, the default libraries do not do certificate checking; you need to do additional work to validate certificates yourself. This needs the following packages installed: * `pyOpenSSL`_ (tested with 16.0.0) * `cryptography`_ (minimum 1.3.4, from pyopenssl) * `idna`_ (minimum 2.0, from cryptography) However, pyopenssl depends on cryptography, which depends on idna, so while we use all three directly here we end up having relatively few packages required. You can install them with the following command: .. code-block:: bash $ python -m pip install pyopenssl cryptography idna To activate certificate checking, call :func:`~urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3` from your Python code before you begin making HTTP requests. This can be done in a ``sitecustomize`` module, or at any other time before your application begins using ``urllib3``, like this: .. code-block:: python try: import urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3() except ImportError: pass Now you can use :mod:`urllib3` as you normally would, and it will support SNI when the required modules are installed. Activating this module also has the positive side effect of disabling SSL/TLS compression in Python 2 (see `CRIME attack`_). .. _sni: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication .. _crime attack: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) .. _pyopenssl: https://www.pyopenssl.org .. _cryptography: https://cryptography.io .. _idna: https://github.com/kjd/idna """ from __future__ import absolute_import import OpenSSL.SSL from cryptography import x509 from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl import backend as openssl_backend from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl.x509 import _Certificate try: from cryptography.x509 import UnsupportedExtension except ImportError: # UnsupportedExtension is gone in cryptography >= 2.1.0 class UnsupportedExtension(Exception): pass from io import BytesIO from socket import error as SocketError from socket import timeout try: # Platform-specific: Python 2 from socket import _fileobject except ImportError: # Platform-specific: Python 3 _fileobject = None from ..packages.backports.makefile import backport_makefile import logging import ssl import sys from .. import util from ..packages import six from ..util.ssl_ import PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT __all__ = ["inject_into_urllib3", "extract_from_urllib3"] # SNI always works. HAS_SNI = True # Map from urllib3 to PyOpenSSL compatible parameter-values. _openssl_versions = { util.PROTOCOL_TLS: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD, PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD, ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1: OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_METHOD, } if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_SSLv3") and hasattr(OpenSSL.SSL, "SSLv3_METHOD"): _openssl_versions[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv3] = OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv3_METHOD if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1") and hasattr(OpenSSL.SSL, "TLSv1_1_METHOD"): _openssl_versions[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1] = OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_1_METHOD if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2") and hasattr(OpenSSL.SSL, "TLSv1_2_METHOD"): _openssl_versions[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2] = OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_2_METHOD _stdlib_to_openssl_verify = { ssl.CERT_NONE: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_NONE, ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER, ssl.CERT_REQUIRED: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER + OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, } _openssl_to_stdlib_verify = dict((v, k) for k, v in _stdlib_to_openssl_verify.items()) # OpenSSL will only write 16K at a time SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE = 16384 orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI orig_util_SSLContext = util.ssl_.SSLContext log = logging.getLogger(__name__) def inject_into_urllib3(): "Monkey-patch urllib3 with PyOpenSSL-backed SSL-support." _validate_dependencies_met() util.SSLContext = PyOpenSSLContext util.ssl_.SSLContext = PyOpenSSLContext util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI util.IS_PYOPENSSL = True util.ssl_.IS_PYOPENSSL = True def extract_from_urllib3(): "Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`." util.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext util.ssl_.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI util.IS_PYOPENSSL = False util.ssl_.IS_PYOPENSSL = False def _validate_dependencies_met(): """ Verifies that PyOpenSSL's package-level dependencies have been met. Throws `ImportError` if they are not met. """ # Method added in `cryptography==1.1`; not available in older versions from cryptography.x509.extensions import Extensions if getattr(Extensions, "get_extension_for_class", None) is None: raise ImportError( "'cryptography' module missing required functionality. " "Try upgrading to v1.3.4 or newer." ) # pyOpenSSL 0.14 and above use cryptography for OpenSSL bindings. The _x509 # attribute is only present on those versions. from OpenSSL.crypto import X509 x509 = X509() if getattr(x509, "_x509", None) is None: raise ImportError( "'pyOpenSSL' module missing required functionality. " "Try upgrading to v0.14 or newer." ) def _dnsname_to_stdlib(name): """ Converts a dNSName SubjectAlternativeName field to the form used by the standard library on the given Python version. Cryptography produces a dNSName as a unicode string that was idna-decoded from ASCII bytes. We need to idna-encode that string to get it back, and then on Python 3 we also need to convert to unicode via UTF-8 (the stdlib uses PyUnicode_FromStringAndSize on it, which decodes via UTF-8). If the name cannot be idna-encoded then we return None signalling that the name given should be skipped. """ def idna_encode(name): """ Borrowed wholesale from the Python Cryptography Project. It turns out that we can't just safely call `idna.encode`: it can explode for wildcard names. This avoids that problem. """ import idna try: for prefix in [u".", u"."]: if name.startswith(prefix): name = name[len(prefix) :] return prefix.encode("ascii") + idna.encode(name) return idna.encode(name) except idna.core.IDNAError: return None # Don't send IPv6 addresses through the IDNA encoder. if ":" in name: return name name = idna_encode(name) if name is None: return None elif sys.version_info >= (3, 0): name = name.decode("utf-8") return name def get_subj_alt_name(peer_cert): """ Given an PyOpenSSL certificate, provides all the subject alternative names. """ # Pass the cert to cryptography, which has much better APIs for this. if hasattr(peer_cert, "to_cryptography"): cert = peer_cert.to_cryptography() else: # This is technically using private APIs, but should work across all # relevant versions before PyOpenSSL got a proper API for this. cert = _Certificate(openssl_backend, peer_cert._x509) # We want to find the SAN extension. Ask Cryptography to locate it (it's # faster than looping in Python) try: ext = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_class(x509.SubjectAlternativeName).value except x509.ExtensionNotFound: # No such extension, return the empty list. return [] except ( x509.DuplicateExtension, UnsupportedExtension, x509.UnsupportedGeneralNameType, UnicodeError, ) as e: # A problem has been found with the quality of the certificate. Assume # no SAN field is present. log.warning( "A problem was encountered with the certificate that prevented " "urllib3 from finding the SubjectAlternativeName field. This can " "affect certificate validation. The error was %s", e, ) return [] # We want to return dNSName and iPAddress fields. We need to cast the IPs # back to strings because the match_hostname function wants them as # strings. # Sadly the DNS names need to be idna encoded and then, on Python 3, UTF-8 # decoded. This is pretty frustrating, but that's what the standard library # does with certificates, and so we need to attempt to do the same. # We also want to skip over names which cannot be idna encoded. names = [ ("DNS", name) for name in map(_dnsname_to_stdlib, ext.get_values_for_type(x509.DNSName)) if name is not None ] names.extend( ("IP Address", str(name)) for name in ext.get_values_for_type(x509.IPAddress) ) return names class WrappedSocket(object): """API-compatibility wrapper for Python OpenSSL's Connection-class. Note: _makefile_refs, _drop() and _reuse() are needed for the garbage collector of pypy. """ def __init__(self, connection, socket, suppress_ragged_eofs=True): self.connection = connection self.socket = socket self.suppress_ragged_eofs = suppress_ragged_eofs self._makefile_refs = 0 self._closed = False def fileno(self): return self.socket.fileno() # Copy-pasted from Python 3.5 source code def _decref_socketios(self): if self._makefile_refs > 0: self._makefile_refs -= 1 if self._closed: self.close() def recv(self, args, *kwargs): try: data = self.connection.recv(args, *kwargs) except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: if self.suppress_ragged_eofs and e.args == (-1, "Unexpected EOF"): return b"" else: raise SocketError(str(e)) except OpenSSL.SSL.ZeroReturnError: if self.connection.get_shutdown() == OpenSSL.SSL.RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: return b"" else: raise except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: if not util.wait_for_read(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): raise timeout("The read operation timed out") else: return self.recv(args, *kwargs) # TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: raise ssl.SSLError("read error: %r" % e) else: return data def recv_into(self, args, *kwargs): try: return self.connection.recv_into(args, *kwargs) except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: if self.suppress_ragged_eofs and e.args == (-1, "Unexpected EOF"): return 0 else: raise SocketError(str(e)) except OpenSSL.SSL.ZeroReturnError: if self.connection.get_shutdown() == OpenSSL.SSL.RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: return 0 else: raise except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: if not util.wait_for_read(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): raise timeout("The read operation timed out") else: return self.recv_into(args, *kwargs) # TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: raise ssl.SSLError("read error: %r" % e) def settimeout(self, timeout): return self.socket.settimeout(timeout) def _send_until_done(self, data): while True: try: return self.connection.send(data) except OpenSSL.SSL.WantWriteError: if not util.wait_for_write(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): raise timeout() continue except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: raise SocketError(str(e)) def sendall(self, data): total_sent = 0 while total_sent < len(data): sent = self._send_until_done( data[total_sent : total_sent + SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE] ) total_sent += sent def shutdown(self): # FIXME rethrow compatible exceptions should we ever use this self.connection.shutdown() def close(self): if self._makefile_refs < 1: try: self._closed = True return self.connection.close() except OpenSSL.SSL.Error: return else: self._makefile_refs -= 1 def getpeercert(self, binary_form=False): x509 = self.connection.get_peer_certificate() if not x509: return x509 if binary_form: return OpenSSL.crypto.dump_certificate(OpenSSL.crypto.FILETYPE_ASN1, x509) return { "subject": ((("commonName", x509.get_subject().CN),),), "subjectAltName": get_subj_alt_name(x509), } def version(self): return self.connection.get_protocol_version_name() def _reuse(self): self._makefile_refs += 1 def _drop(self): if self._makefile_refs < 1: self.close() else: self._makefile_refs -= 1 if _fileobject: # Platform-specific: Python 2 def makefile(self, mode, bufsize=-1): self._makefile_refs += 1 return _fileobject(self, mode, bufsize, close=True) else: # Platform-specific: Python 3 makefile = backport_makefile WrappedSocket.makefile = makefile class PyOpenSSLContext(object): """ I am a wrapper class for the PyOpenSSL ``Context`` object. I am responsible for translating the interface of the standard library ``SSLContext`` object to calls into PyOpenSSL. """ def __init__(self, protocol): self.protocol = _openssl_versions[protocol] self._ctx = OpenSSL.SSL.Context(self.protocol) self._options = 0 self.check_hostname = False @property def options(self): return self._options @options.setter def options(self, value): self._options = value self._ctx.set_options(value) @property def verify_mode(self): return _openssl_to_stdlib_verify[self._ctx.get_verify_mode()] @verify_mode.setter def verify_mode(self, value): self._ctx.set_verify(_stdlib_to_openssl_verify[value], _verify_callback) def set_default_verify_paths(self): self._ctx.set_default_verify_paths() def set_ciphers(self, ciphers): if isinstance(ciphers, six.text_type): ciphers = ciphers.encode("utf-8") self._ctx.set_cipher_list(ciphers) def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None): if cafile is not None: cafile = cafile.encode("utf-8") if capath is not None: capath = capath.encode("utf-8") try: self._ctx.load_verify_locations(cafile, capath) if cadata is not None: self._ctx.load_verify_locations(BytesIO(cadata)) except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: raise ssl.SSLError("unable to load trusted certificates: %r" % e) def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None): self._ctx.use_certificate_chain_file(certfile) if password is not None: if not isinstance(password, six.binary_type): password = password.encode("utf-8") self._ctx.set_passwd_cb(lambda _: password) self._ctx.use_privatekey_file(keyfile or certfile) def set_alpn_protocols(self, protocols): protocols = [six.ensure_binary(p) for p in protocols] return self._ctx.set_alpn_protos(protocols) def wrap_socket( self, sock, server_side=False, do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, server_hostname=None, ): cnx = OpenSSL.SSL.Connection(self._ctx, sock) if isinstance(server_hostname, six.text_type): # Platform-specific: Python 3 server_hostname = server_hostname.encode("utf-8") if server_hostname is not None: cnx.set_tlsext_host_name(server_hostname) cnx.set_connect_state() while True: try: cnx.do_handshake() except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: if not util.wait_for_read(sock, sock.gettimeout()): raise timeout("select timed out") continue except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: raise ssl.SSLError("bad handshake: %r" % e) break return WrappedSocket(cnx, sock) def _verify_callback(cnx, x509, err_no, err_depth, return_code): return err_no == 0	16.48 KB	2021-05-26 16:59
📄 securetransport.py """ SecureTranport support for urllib3 via ctypes. This makes platform-native TLS available to urllib3 users on macOS without the use of a compiler. This is an important feature because the Python Package Index is moving to become a TLSv1.2-or-higher server, and the default OpenSSL that ships with macOS is not capable of doing TLSv1.2. The only way to resolve this is to give macOS users an alternative solution to the problem, and that solution is to use SecureTransport. We use ctypes here because this solution must not require a compiler. That's because pip is not allowed to require a compiler either. This is not intended to be a seriously long-term solution to this problem. The hope is that PEP 543 will eventually solve this issue for us, at which point we can retire this contrib module. But in the short term, we need to solve the impending tire fire that is Python on Mac without this kind of contrib module. So...here we are. To use this module, simply import and inject it:: import urllib3.contrib.securetransport urllib3.contrib.securetransport.inject_into_urllib3() Happy TLSing! This code is a bastardised version of the code found in Will Bond's oscrypto library. An enormous debt is owed to him for blazing this trail for us. For that reason, this code should be considered to be covered both by urllib3's license and by oscrypto's: .. code-block:: Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Will Bond <will@wbond.net> Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. """ from __future__ import absolute_import import contextlib import ctypes import errno import os.path import shutil import socket import ssl import struct import threading import weakref import six from .. import util from ..util.ssl_ import PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT from ._securetransport.bindings import CoreFoundation, Security, SecurityConst from ._securetransport.low_level import ( _assert_no_error, _build_tls_unknown_ca_alert, _cert_array_from_pem, _create_cfstring_array, _load_client_cert_chain, _temporary_keychain, ) try: # Platform-specific: Python 2 from socket import _fileobject except ImportError: # Platform-specific: Python 3 _fileobject = None from ..packages.backports.makefile import backport_makefile __all__ = ["inject_into_urllib3", "extract_from_urllib3"] # SNI always works HAS_SNI = True orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI orig_util_SSLContext = util.ssl_.SSLContext # This dictionary is used by the read callback to obtain a handle to the # calling wrapped socket. This is a pretty silly approach, but for now it'll # do. I feel like I should be able to smuggle a handle to the wrapped socket # directly in the SSLConnectionRef, but for now this approach will work I # guess. # # We need to lock around this structure for inserts, but we don't do it for # reads/writes in the callbacks. The reasoning here goes as follows: # # 1. It is not possible to call into the callbacks before the dictionary is # populated, so once in the callback the id must be in the dictionary. # 2. The callbacks don't mutate the dictionary, they only read from it, and # so cannot conflict with any of the insertions. # # This is good: if we had to lock in the callbacks we'd drastically slow down # the performance of this code. _connection_refs = weakref.WeakValueDictionary() _connection_ref_lock = threading.Lock() # Limit writes to 16kB. This is OpenSSL's limit, but we'll cargo-cult it over # for no better reason than we need a limit, and this one is right there. SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE = 16384 # This is our equivalent of util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS, but expanded out to # individual cipher suites. We need to do this because this is how # SecureTransport wants them. CIPHER_SUITES = [ SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ] # Basically this is simple: for PROTOCOL_SSLv23 we turn it into a low of # TLSv1 and a high of TLSv1.2. For everything else, we pin to that version. # TLSv1 to 1.2 are supported on macOS 10.8+ _protocol_to_min_max = { util.PROTOCOL_TLS: (SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12), PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT: (SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12), } if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_SSLv2"): _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv2] = ( SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol2, SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol2, ) if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_SSLv3"): _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv3] = ( SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol3, SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol3, ) if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1"): _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1] = ( SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, ) if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1"): _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1] = ( SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol11, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol11, ) if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2"): _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2] = ( SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12, ) def inject_into_urllib3(): """ Monkey-patch urllib3 with SecureTransport-backed SSL-support. """ util.SSLContext = SecureTransportContext util.ssl_.SSLContext = SecureTransportContext util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI util.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = True util.ssl_.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = True def extract_from_urllib3(): """ Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`. """ util.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext util.ssl_.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI util.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = False util.ssl_.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = False def _read_callback(connection_id, data_buffer, data_length_pointer): """ SecureTransport read callback. This is called by ST to request that data be returned from the socket. """ wrapped_socket = None try: wrapped_socket = _connection_refs.get(connection_id) if wrapped_socket is None: return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal base_socket = wrapped_socket.socket requested_length = data_length_pointer[0] timeout = wrapped_socket.gettimeout() error = None read_count = 0 try: while read_count < requested_length: if timeout is None or timeout >= 0: if not util.wait_for_read(base_socket, timeout): raise socket.error(errno.EAGAIN, "timed out") remaining = requested_length - read_count buffer = (ctypes.c_char * remaining).from_address( data_buffer + read_count ) chunk_size = base_socket.recv_into(buffer, remaining) read_count += chunk_size if not chunk_size: if not read_count: return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedGraceful break except (socket.error) as e: error = e.errno if error is not None and error != errno.EAGAIN: data_length_pointer[0] = read_count if error == errno.ECONNRESET or error == errno.EPIPE: return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedAbort raise data_length_pointer[0] = read_count if read_count != requested_length: return SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock return 0 except Exception as e: if wrapped_socket is not None: wrapped_socket._exception = e return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal def _write_callback(connection_id, data_buffer, data_length_pointer): """ SecureTransport write callback. This is called by ST to request that data actually be sent on the network. """ wrapped_socket = None try: wrapped_socket = _connection_refs.get(connection_id) if wrapped_socket is None: return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal base_socket = wrapped_socket.socket bytes_to_write = data_length_pointer[0] data = ctypes.string_at(data_buffer, bytes_to_write) timeout = wrapped_socket.gettimeout() error = None sent = 0 try: while sent < bytes_to_write: if timeout is None or timeout >= 0: if not util.wait_for_write(base_socket, timeout): raise socket.error(errno.EAGAIN, "timed out") chunk_sent = base_socket.send(data) sent += chunk_sent # This has some needless copying here, but I'm not sure there's # much value in optimising this data path. data = data[chunk_sent:] except (socket.error) as e: error = e.errno if error is not None and error != errno.EAGAIN: data_length_pointer[0] = sent if error == errno.ECONNRESET or error == errno.EPIPE: return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedAbort raise data_length_pointer[0] = sent if sent != bytes_to_write: return SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock return 0 except Exception as e: if wrapped_socket is not None: wrapped_socket._exception = e return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal # We need to keep these two objects references alive: if they get GC'd while # in use then SecureTransport could attempt to call a function that is in freed # memory. That would be...uh...bad. Yeah, that's the word. Bad. _read_callback_pointer = Security.SSLReadFunc(_read_callback) _write_callback_pointer = Security.SSLWriteFunc(_write_callback) class WrappedSocket(object): """ API-compatibility wrapper for Python's OpenSSL wrapped socket object. Note: _makefile_refs, _drop(), and _reuse() are needed for the garbage collector of PyPy. """ def __init__(self, socket): self.socket = socket self.context = None self._makefile_refs = 0 self._closed = False self._exception = None self._keychain = None self._keychain_dir = None self._client_cert_chain = None # We save off the previously-configured timeout and then set it to # zero. This is done because we use select and friends to handle the # timeouts, but if we leave the timeout set on the lower socket then # Python will "kindly" call select on that socket again for us. Avoid # that by forcing the timeout to zero. self._timeout = self.socket.gettimeout() self.socket.settimeout(0) @contextlib.contextmanager def _raise_on_error(self): """ A context manager that can be used to wrap calls that do I/O from SecureTransport. If any of the I/O callbacks hit an exception, this context manager will correctly propagate the exception after the fact. This avoids silently swallowing those exceptions. It also correctly forces the socket closed. """ self._exception = None # We explicitly don't catch around this yield because in the unlikely # event that an exception was hit in the block we don't want to swallow # it. yield if self._exception is not None: exception, self._exception = self._exception, None self.close() raise exception def _set_ciphers(self): """ Sets up the allowed ciphers. By default this matches the set in util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS, at least as supported by macOS. This is done custom and doesn't allow changing at this time, mostly because parsing OpenSSL cipher strings is going to be a freaking nightmare. """ ciphers = (Security.SSLCipherSuite * len(CIPHER_SUITES))(CIPHER_SUITES) result = Security.SSLSetEnabledCiphers( self.context, ciphers, len(CIPHER_SUITES) ) _assert_no_error(result) def _set_alpn_protocols(self, protocols): """ Sets up the ALPN protocols on the context. """ if not protocols: return protocols_arr = _create_cfstring_array(protocols) try: result = Security.SSLSetALPNProtocols(self.context, protocols_arr) _assert_no_error(result) finally: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(protocols_arr) def _custom_validate(self, verify, trust_bundle): """ Called when we have set custom validation. We do this in two cases: first, when cert validation is entirely disabled; and second, when using a custom trust DB. Raises an SSLError if the connection is not trusted. """ # If we disabled cert validation, just say: cool. if not verify: return successes = ( SecurityConst.kSecTrustResultUnspecified, SecurityConst.kSecTrustResultProceed, ) try: trust_result = self._evaluate_trust(trust_bundle) if trust_result in successes: return reason = "error code: %d" % (trust_result,) except Exception as e: # Do not trust on error reason = "exception: %r" % (e,) # SecureTransport does not send an alert nor shuts down the connection. rec = _build_tls_unknown_ca_alert(self.version()) self.socket.sendall(rec) # close the connection immediately # l_onoff = 1, activate linger # l_linger = 0, linger for 0 seoncds opts = struct.pack("ii", 1, 0) self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_LINGER, opts) self.close() raise ssl.SSLError("certificate verify failed, %s" % reason) def _evaluate_trust(self, trust_bundle): # We want data in memory, so load it up. if os.path.isfile(trust_bundle): with open(trust_bundle, "rb") as f: trust_bundle = f.read() cert_array = None trust = Security.SecTrustRef() try: # Get a CFArray that contains the certs we want. cert_array = _cert_array_from_pem(trust_bundle) # Ok, now the hard part. We want to get the SecTrustRef that ST has # created for this connection, shove our CAs into it, tell ST to # ignore everything else it knows, and then ask if it can build a # chain. This is a buuuunch of code. result = Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust(self.context, ctypes.byref(trust)) _assert_no_error(result) if not trust: raise ssl.SSLError("Failed to copy trust reference") result = Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(trust, cert_array) _assert_no_error(result) result = Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly(trust, True) _assert_no_error(result) trust_result = Security.SecTrustResultType() result = Security.SecTrustEvaluate(trust, ctypes.byref(trust_result)) _assert_no_error(result) finally: if trust: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(trust) if cert_array is not None: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(cert_array) return trust_result.value def handshake( self, server_hostname, verify, trust_bundle, min_version, max_version, client_cert, client_key, client_key_passphrase, alpn_protocols, ): """ Actually performs the TLS handshake. This is run automatically by wrapped socket, and shouldn't be needed in user code. """ # First, we do the initial bits of connection setup. We need to create # a context, set its I/O funcs, and set the connection reference. self.context = Security.SSLCreateContext( None, SecurityConst.kSSLClientSide, SecurityConst.kSSLStreamType ) result = Security.SSLSetIOFuncs( self.context, _read_callback_pointer, _write_callback_pointer ) _assert_no_error(result) # Here we need to compute the handle to use. We do this by taking the # id of self modulo 231 - 1. If this is already in the dictionary, we # just keep incrementing by one until we find a free space. with _connection_ref_lock: handle = id(self) % 2147483647 while handle in _connection_refs: handle = (handle + 1) % 2147483647 _connection_refs[handle] = self result = Security.SSLSetConnection(self.context, handle) _assert_no_error(result) # If we have a server hostname, we should set that too. if server_hostname: if not isinstance(server_hostname, bytes): server_hostname = server_hostname.encode("utf-8") result = Security.SSLSetPeerDomainName( self.context, server_hostname, len(server_hostname) ) _assert_no_error(result) # Setup the ciphers. self._set_ciphers() # Setup the ALPN protocols. self._set_alpn_protocols(alpn_protocols) # Set the minimum and maximum TLS versions. result = Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMin(self.context, min_version) _assert_no_error(result) result = Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMax(self.context, max_version) _assert_no_error(result) # If there's a trust DB, we need to use it. We do that by telling # SecureTransport to break on server auth. We also do that if we don't # want to validate the certs at all: we just won't actually do any # authing in that case. if not verify or trust_bundle is not None: result = Security.SSLSetSessionOption( self.context, SecurityConst.kSSLSessionOptionBreakOnServerAuth, True ) _assert_no_error(result) # If there's a client cert, we need to use it. if client_cert: self._keychain, self._keychain_dir = _temporary_keychain() self._client_cert_chain = _load_client_cert_chain( self._keychain, client_cert, client_key ) result = Security.SSLSetCertificate(self.context, self._client_cert_chain) _assert_no_error(result) while True: with self._raise_on_error(): result = Security.SSLHandshake(self.context) if result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock: raise socket.timeout("handshake timed out") elif result == SecurityConst.errSSLServerAuthCompleted: self._custom_validate(verify, trust_bundle) continue else: _assert_no_error(result) break def fileno(self): return self.socket.fileno() # Copy-pasted from Python 3.5 source code def _decref_socketios(self): if self._makefile_refs > 0: self._makefile_refs -= 1 if self._closed: self.close() def recv(self, bufsiz): buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(bufsiz) bytes_read = self.recv_into(buffer, bufsiz) data = buffer[:bytes_read] return data def recv_into(self, buffer, nbytes=None): # Read short on EOF. if self._closed: return 0 if nbytes is None: nbytes = len(buffer) buffer = (ctypes.c_char nbytes).from_buffer(buffer) processed_bytes = ctypes.c_size_t(0) with self._raise_on_error(): result = Security.SSLRead( self.context, buffer, nbytes, ctypes.byref(processed_bytes) ) # There are some result codes that we want to treat as "not always # errors". Specifically, those are errSSLWouldBlock, # errSSLClosedGraceful, and errSSLClosedNoNotify. if result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock: # If we didn't process any bytes, then this was just a time out. # However, we can get errSSLWouldBlock in situations when we did # read some data, and in those cases we should just read "short" # and return. if processed_bytes.value == 0: # Timed out, no data read. raise socket.timeout("recv timed out") elif result in ( SecurityConst.errSSLClosedGraceful, SecurityConst.errSSLClosedNoNotify, ): # The remote peer has closed this connection. We should do so as # well. Note that we don't actually return here because in # principle this could actually be fired along with return data. # It's unlikely though. self.close() else: _assert_no_error(result) # Ok, we read and probably succeeded. We should return whatever data # was actually read. return processed_bytes.value def settimeout(self, timeout): self._timeout = timeout def gettimeout(self): return self._timeout def send(self, data): processed_bytes = ctypes.c_size_t(0) with self._raise_on_error(): result = Security.SSLWrite( self.context, data, len(data), ctypes.byref(processed_bytes) ) if result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock and processed_bytes.value == 0: # Timed out raise socket.timeout("send timed out") else: _assert_no_error(result) # We sent, and probably succeeded. Tell them how much we sent. return processed_bytes.value def sendall(self, data): total_sent = 0 while total_sent < len(data): sent = self.send(data[total_sent : total_sent + SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE]) total_sent += sent def shutdown(self): with self._raise_on_error(): Security.SSLClose(self.context) def close(self): # TODO: should I do clean shutdown here? Do I have to? if self._makefile_refs < 1: self._closed = True if self.context: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self.context) self.context = None if self._client_cert_chain: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self._client_cert_chain) self._client_cert_chain = None if self._keychain: Security.SecKeychainDelete(self._keychain) CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self._keychain) shutil.rmtree(self._keychain_dir) self._keychain = self._keychain_dir = None return self.socket.close() else: self._makefile_refs -= 1 def getpeercert(self, binary_form=False): # Urgh, annoying. # # Here's how we do this: # # 1. Call SSLCopyPeerTrust to get hold of the trust object for this # connection. # 2. Call SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex for index 0 to get the leaf. # 3. To get the CN, call SecCertificateCopyCommonName and process that # string so that it's of the appropriate type. # 4. To get the SAN, we need to do something a bit more complex: # a. Call SecCertificateCopyValues to get the data, requesting # kSecOIDSubjectAltName. # b. Mess about with this dictionary to try to get the SANs out. # # This is gross. Really gross. It's going to be a few hundred LoC extra # just to repeat something that SecureTransport can already do. So my # operating assumption at this time is that what we want to do is # instead to just flag to urllib3 that it shouldn't do its own hostname # validation when using SecureTransport. if not binary_form: raise ValueError("SecureTransport only supports dumping binary certs") trust = Security.SecTrustRef() certdata = None der_bytes = None try: # Grab the trust store. result = Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust(self.context, ctypes.byref(trust)) _assert_no_error(result) if not trust: # Probably we haven't done the handshake yet. No biggie. return None cert_count = Security.SecTrustGetCertificateCount(trust) if not cert_count: # Also a case that might happen if we haven't handshaked. # Handshook? Handshaken? return None leaf = Security.SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0) assert leaf # Ok, now we want the DER bytes. certdata = Security.SecCertificateCopyData(leaf) assert certdata data_length = CoreFoundation.CFDataGetLength(certdata) data_buffer = CoreFoundation.CFDataGetBytePtr(certdata) der_bytes = ctypes.string_at(data_buffer, data_length) finally: if certdata: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(certdata) if trust: CoreFoundation.CFRelease(trust) return der_bytes def version(self): protocol = Security.SSLProtocol() result = Security.SSLGetNegotiatedProtocolVersion( self.context, ctypes.byref(protocol) ) _assert_no_error(result) if protocol.value == SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol13: raise ssl.SSLError("SecureTransport does not support TLS 1.3") elif protocol.value == SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12: return "TLSv1.2" elif protocol.value == SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol11: return "TLSv1.1" elif protocol.value == SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1: return "TLSv1" elif protocol.value == SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol3: return "SSLv3" elif protocol.value == SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol2: return "SSLv2" else: raise ssl.SSLError("Unknown TLS version: %r" % protocol) def _reuse(self): self._makefile_refs += 1 def _drop(self): if self._makefile_refs < 1: self.close() else: self._makefile_refs -= 1 if _fileobject: # Platform-specific: Python 2 def makefile(self, mode, bufsize=-1): self._makefile_refs += 1 return _fileobject(self, mode, bufsize, close=True) else: # Platform-specific: Python 3 def makefile(self, mode="r", buffering=None, args, kwargs): # We disable buffering with SecureTransport because it conflicts with # the buffering that ST does internally (see issue #1153 for more). buffering = 0 return backport_makefile(self, mode, buffering, args, **kwargs) WrappedSocket.makefile = makefile class SecureTransportContext(object): """ I am a wrapper class for the SecureTransport library, to translate the interface of the standard library ``SSLContext`` object to calls into SecureTransport. """ def __init__(self, protocol): self._min_version, self._max_version = _protocol_to_min_max[protocol] self._options = 0 self._verify = False self._trust_bundle = None self._client_cert = None self._client_key = None self._client_key_passphrase = None self._alpn_protocols = None @property def check_hostname(self): """ SecureTransport cannot have its hostname checking disabled. For more, see the comment on getpeercert() in this file. """ return True @check_hostname.setter def check_hostname(self, value): """ SecureTransport cannot have its hostname checking disabled. For more, see the comment on getpeercert() in this file. """ pass @property def options(self): # TODO: Well, crap. # # So this is the bit of the code that is the most likely to cause us # trouble. Essentially we need to enumerate all of the SSL options that # users might want to use and try to see if we can sensibly translate # them, or whether we should just ignore them. return self._options @options.setter def options(self, value): # TODO: Update in line with above. self._options = value @property def verify_mode(self): return ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if self._verify else ssl.CERT_NONE @verify_mode.setter def verify_mode(self, value): self._verify = True if value == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED else False def set_default_verify_paths(self): # So, this has to do something a bit weird. Specifically, what it does # is nothing. # # This means that, if we had previously had load_verify_locations # called, this does not undo that. We need to do that because it turns # out that the rest of the urllib3 code will attempt to load the # default verify paths if it hasn't been told about any paths, even if # the context itself was sometime earlier. We resolve that by just # ignoring it. pass def load_default_certs(self): return self.set_default_verify_paths() def set_ciphers(self, ciphers): # For now, we just require the default cipher string. if ciphers != util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS: raise ValueError("SecureTransport doesn't support custom cipher strings") def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None): # OK, we only really support cadata and cafile. if capath is not None: raise ValueError("SecureTransport does not support cert directories") # Raise if cafile does not exist. if cafile is not None: with open(cafile): pass self._trust_bundle = cafile or cadata def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None): self._client_cert = certfile self._client_key = keyfile self._client_cert_passphrase = password def set_alpn_protocols(self, protocols): """ Sets the ALPN protocols that will later be set on the context. Raises a NotImplementedError if ALPN is not supported. """ if not hasattr(Security, "SSLSetALPNProtocols"): raise NotImplementedError( "SecureTransport supports ALPN only in macOS 10.12+" ) self._alpn_protocols = [six.ensure_binary(p) for p in protocols] def wrap_socket( self, sock, server_side=False, do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, server_hostname=None, ): # So, what do we do here? Firstly, we assert some properties. This is a # stripped down shim, so there is some functionality we don't support. # See PEP 543 for the real deal. assert not server_side assert do_handshake_on_connect assert suppress_ragged_eofs # Ok, we're good to go. Now we want to create the wrapped socket object # and store it in the appropriate place. wrapped_socket = WrappedSocket(sock) # Now we can handshake wrapped_socket.handshake( server_hostname, self._verify, self._trust_bundle, self._min_version, self._max_version, self._client_cert, self._client_key, self._client_key_passphrase, self._alpn_protocols, ) return wrapped_socket	33.61 KB	2021-05-26 16:59
📄 socks.py # -- coding: utf-8 -- """ This module contains provisional support for SOCKS proxies from within urllib3. This module supports SOCKS4, SOCKS4A (an extension of SOCKS4), and SOCKS5. To enable its functionality, either install PySocks or install this module with the ``socks`` extra. The SOCKS implementation supports the full range of urllib3 features. It also supports the following SOCKS features: - SOCKS4A (``proxy_url='socks4a://...``) - SOCKS4 (``proxy_url='socks4://...``) - SOCKS5 with remote DNS (``proxy_url='socks5h://...``) - SOCKS5 with local DNS (``proxy_url='socks5://...``) - Usernames and passwords for the SOCKS proxy .. note:: It is recommended to use ``socks5h://`` or ``socks4a://`` schemes in your ``proxy_url`` to ensure that DNS resolution is done from the remote server instead of client-side when connecting to a domain name. SOCKS4 supports IPv4 and domain names with the SOCKS4A extension. SOCKS5 supports IPv4, IPv6, and domain names. When connecting to a SOCKS4 proxy the ``username`` portion of the ``proxy_url`` will be sent as the ``userid`` section of the SOCKS request: .. code-block:: python proxy_url="socks4a://<userid>@proxy-host" When connecting to a SOCKS5 proxy the ``username`` and ``password`` portion of the ``proxy_url`` will be sent as the username/password to authenticate with the proxy: .. code-block:: python proxy_url="socks5h://<username>:<password>@proxy-host" """ from __future__ import absolute_import try: import socks except ImportError: import warnings from ..exceptions import DependencyWarning warnings.warn( ( "SOCKS support in urllib3 requires the installation of optional " "dependencies: specifically, PySocks. For more information, see " "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/contrib.html#socks-proxies" ), DependencyWarning, ) raise from socket import error as SocketError from socket import timeout as SocketTimeout from ..connection import HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection from ..connectionpool import HTTPConnectionPool, HTTPSConnectionPool from ..exceptions import ConnectTimeoutError, NewConnectionError from ..poolmanager import PoolManager from ..util.url import parse_url try: import ssl except ImportError: ssl = None class SOCKSConnection(HTTPConnection): """ A plain-text HTTP connection that connects via a SOCKS proxy. """ def __init__(self, args, kwargs): self._socks_options = kwargs.pop("_socks_options") super(SOCKSConnection, self).__init__(args, kwargs) def _new_conn(self): """ Establish a new connection via the SOCKS proxy. """ extra_kw = {} if self.source_address: extra_kw["source_address"] = self.source_address if self.socket_options: extra_kw["socket_options"] = self.socket_options try: conn = socks.create_connection( (self.host, self.port), proxy_type=self._socks_options["socks_version"], proxy_addr=self._socks_options["proxy_host"], proxy_port=self._socks_options["proxy_port"], proxy_username=self._socks_options["username"], proxy_password=self._socks_options["password"], proxy_rdns=self._socks_options["rdns"], timeout=self.timeout, extra_kw ) except SocketTimeout: raise ConnectTimeoutError( self, "Connection to %s timed out. (connect timeout=%s)" % (self.host, self.timeout), ) except socks.ProxyError as e: # This is fragile as hell, but it seems to be the only way to raise # useful errors here. if e.socket_err: error = e.socket_err if isinstance(error, SocketTimeout): raise ConnectTimeoutError( self, "Connection to %s timed out. (connect timeout=%s)" % (self.host, self.timeout), ) else: raise NewConnectionError( self, "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % error ) else: raise NewConnectionError( self, "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % e ) except SocketError as e: # Defensive: PySocks should catch all these. raise NewConnectionError( self, "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % e ) return conn # We don't need to duplicate the Verified/Unverified distinction from # urllib3/connection.py here because the HTTPSConnection will already have been # correctly set to either the Verified or Unverified form by that module. This # means the SOCKSHTTPSConnection will automatically be the correct type. class SOCKSHTTPSConnection(SOCKSConnection, HTTPSConnection): pass class SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(HTTPConnectionPool): ConnectionCls = SOCKSConnection class SOCKSHTTPSConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool): ConnectionCls = SOCKSHTTPSConnection class SOCKSProxyManager(PoolManager): """ A version of the urllib3 ProxyManager that routes connections via the defined SOCKS proxy. """ pool_classes_by_scheme = { "http": SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool, "https": SOCKSHTTPSConnectionPool, } def __init__( self, proxy_url, username=None, password=None, num_pools=10, headers=None, connection_pool_kw ): parsed = parse_url(proxy_url) if username is None and password is None and parsed.auth is not None: split = parsed.auth.split(":") if len(split) == 2: username, password = split if parsed.scheme == "socks5": socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5 rdns = False elif parsed.scheme == "socks5h": socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5 rdns = True elif parsed.scheme == "socks4": socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS4 rdns = False elif parsed.scheme == "socks4a": socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS4 rdns = True else: raise ValueError("Unable to determine SOCKS version from %s" % proxy_url) self.proxy_url = proxy_url socks_options = { "socks_version": socks_version, "proxy_host": parsed.host, "proxy_port": parsed.port, "username": username, "password": password, "rdns": rdns, } connection_pool_kw["_socks_options"] = socks_options super(SOCKSProxyManager, self).__init__( num_pools, headers, connection_pool_kw ) self.pool_classes_by_scheme = SOCKSProxyManager.pool_classes_by_scheme	6.93 KB	2021-05-26 16:59

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